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WEST VIRGINIA
Michael K. Reer† and Valerie Antonette††
I.

RECENT OIL AND GAS ACTIVITY IN WEST VIRGINIA1

West Virginia is one of the most prolific energy-producing states in
the country. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, West Virginia ranked seventh among states in
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I3.13
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production of natural gas in 2018, contributing 1.8 trillion cubic feet.2
Further, the consistency in permit application appears to support the
proposition that West Virginia operators will continue producing
significant volumes well in the future. The West Virginia Department
of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) issued 582 horizontal well
permits in 2015, 223 in 2016, 509 in 2017, 433 in 2018, and 467 in
2019.3
II. LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
The West Virginia Legislature is a bicameral body that holds
regular sixty-day sessions each year, generally beginning on the
second Wednesday in January.4 The 2020 Regular Session was
particularly active with respect to bills relating to oil and gas
development.
A. HB 4217 Changes Spacing Requirements for Deep Wells
On March 25, 2020, Governor Jim Justice signed HB 4217 into law,
which authorizes a legislative rule of the Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (the “Commission”) amending the minimum spacing
requirements for deep wells in West Virginia.5 The Commission
regulates the development of deep wells in West Virginia.6 Deep wells
are those drilled to a depth below the top of the uppermost member of
the Onondaga Group, which includes Utica wells.7
Previously, the Commission’s rules required minimum spacing of
3,000 feet between deep wells.8 On June 14, 2019, the Commission
filed an emergency rule to change the minimum spacing requirements,
2. West Virginia State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.,
(Sept.
19,
2019),
https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=WV#tabs-3
[https://perma.cc/9JKT-STBM].
3. Horizontal Drilling, W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., https://dep.wv.gov/oiland-gas/Horizontal-Permits/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5VRZ-SBDA]
(last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
4. Citizen’s Guide to the Legislature, W. VA. LEGISLATURE,
https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Educational/citizens/process.cfm#:~:text=On%20th
e%20first%20day%20of,with%20the%20state’s%20budget%20bill
[https://perma.cc/LUG6-3JNN] (last visited June 5, 2020).
5. W. VA. CODE § 64-3-2 (2020).
6. Mission,
OIL
AND
GAS
CONSERVATION
COMMISSION,
https://ogcc.wv.gov/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M649-5J9S] (last visited
Sept. 13, 2020).
7. W. VA. CODE R. § 39-1-2 (2020).
8. Notice of an Emergency Rule June 14, 2019 (codified with some differences
in language at W. VA. CODE. R. § 39-1-4.2.1.a (2020)).
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noting that 3,000-foot spacing is “impractical and uneconomical” and
that, on a practical basis, “every company desiring to hydraulically
fracture a formation below the top of the Onondaga must formally
request a public hearing before the Commission to obtain an exception
to the existing 3,000-foot rule [and] bring witnesses to Charleston to
build a record that supports and justifies each requested exception.”9
The final rules, confirmed by HB 4217, require that in the absence
of an exception (also known as an operational order) or field rules,
deep wells must adhere to the following spacing restrictions: (1) no
less than 1,000 feet from the productive interval measured
perpendicularly from a previously permitted deep well operated by a
different operator; (2) no less than 800 feet from the productive
interval measured perpendicularly from a previously permitted deep
well operated by the same operator; (3) no less than 500 feet from a
lease or unit boundary measured perpendicularly for wells where the
adjoining lease or unit is operated by a different operator; and (4) no
less than 400 feet from a lease or unit boundary measured
perpendicularly for wells where the adjoining lease or unit is operated
by the same operator.10 In addition, the distance between the
productive interval nearest the heel or toe to a new deep well may not
be less than 150 feet from the productive interval nearest the heel or
toe of a previously permitted deep well and no less than seventy-five
feet from a lease or unit boundary.11
B. SB 554 Requires Lessees to Release Terminated Leases
SB 554, effective May 31, 2020, requires lessees to deliver a
properly executed and notarized release (in recordable form and
without cost to the lessor) of leases that have terminated, expired, or
been canceled.12 Lessees must deliver the notarized release to lessors
within sixty days of lease termination, expiration, or cancellation.13
If the lessee fails to provide a timely release, the lessor may provide
notice to the lessee of the lessee’s failure to provide the required
release.14 The notice must include a statement that the lease is
9. Id.
10. W. VA. CODE R. § 39-1-4.2.2.a.1 to 4, 6 (2020) (Operators may agree, in
writing, to waive the greater spacing limitations applicable to wells operated by
different operators and instead adhere to the spacing limitations applicable to wells
operated by the same operator).
11. § 4.2.2.a.5.
12. W. VA. CODE § 36-4-9b(a) (2020).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 36-4-9b(b).
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terminated, expired, or canceled according to its terms (including the
date of termination, expiration, or cancellation), that the lessee has a
duty to provide a release, and that if the release, or a written dispute to
such termination, expiration, or cancellation, is not received by the
lessor within sixty days from receipt of the notice, the lessor has the
right to file an affidavit of termination, expiration, or cancellation.15
The notice must also include: (1) the name and address of the lessor;
(2) a brief description of the land covered by the lease; (3) the name
or API number of any well on the land covered by the lease (if known
to the lessor); (4) the name of any unit that includes land covered by
the lease (if known to the lessor); (5) the recording information
regarding the lease (or memorandum of lease), execution date of the
lease, and the identity of the original lessor and lessee under the lease;
and (6) a service sheet showing the names and addresses of all persons
upon whom the notice has been served.16 The notice must be sent to
the lessee, all other lessors, and all other persons who have an interest
in the leasehold estate or the oil and natural gas leased thereunder.17
After receiving notice, if the lessee disputes in good faith that the
oil or natural gas lease is terminated, expired, or canceled as stated in
the notice, within sixty days of receiving the notice, the lessee must
deliver a written dispute of the contents of the notice to the lessor,
detailing the good-faith basis for such dispute.18
A lessor who serves notice, but fails to receive a timely dispute from
the lessee, may record an affidavit of termination, expiration, or
cancellation in the office of the county clerk.19 An affidavit of
termination, expiration, or cancellation must contain: (1) the name and
address of the affiant; (2) the names and addresses of the lessor and
lessee; (3) if located in a unit, the name of the unit, if known to the
affiant; (4) if there is a well on the land, the name or API number of
the well, if known to the affiant; (5) the recording information for the
lease (or memorandum of lease), the execution date of the lease, and
15. Id. § 36-4-9(b)(1)(A)–(C).
16. Id. § 36-4-9b(b)(2)–(7).
17. Id. § 36-4-9b(c) (stating that “A lessor’s inability to afford notice to everyone
to whom notice is to be given thereunder does not relieve a lessee of its obligation
to respond”); see also id. § 36-4-9b(d) (stating that “Service of notice under
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be effected either personally or by
certified mail to the recipient’s last known business address, or, if service cannot
reasonably be made by those means, by publication once a week for two weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county or counties in which the lands covered
by the lease are located”).
18. Id. § 36-4-9b(e).
19. Id. § 36-4-9b(f).
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the names of the original lessors and lessees; (6) a brief recitation of
the facts known to the affiant relating to the termination, expiration,
or cancellation of the lease, including relevant dates; (7) a statement
that the lessor complied with the duty to serve proper notice to the
lessee and that the lessee failed to provide a timely challenge to the
notice (the affidavit must attach a copy of the notice made and served);
and (8) the notarized signature of the affiant.20
A person filing an affidavit must provide service of the affidavit
upon all persons who received the notice. The filing of an affidavit
does not constitute a modification of a lease, or limit, waive, or
prejudice any claim or defense of any party to the lease.21
C. Legislature Addresses Expedited Permits, the Abandoned Well
Plugging Fund, and Unknown Royalty Owners
On February 18, 2020, Governor Justice signed HB 4091 into law,
which provides a process for operators to receive expedited permits
and expedited permit modifications for certain horizontal production
wells.22 Expedited permits and expedited permit modifications are not
available for deep wells.23
To file an expedited permit application, the operator must pay an
additional fee of $20,000 for an initial horizontal well and $10,000 for
each additional horizontal well proposed for the same pad.24 Upon
receipt of the permit application, WVDEP must issue or deny an
expedited permit within forty-five days unless WVDEP seeks
additional information or modification from the applicant, which tolls
the forty-five-day period until WVDEP receives the requested
information.25 For each day WVDEP exceeds the allotted time
approving or denying the expedited permit application, the agency
must refund $1,333.33 for an initial well and $666.66 for additional
wells proposed on the same pad until the expedited fee is reduced to
the normal permit fee amount.26

20. Id. § 36-4-9b(g).
21. Id. § 36-4-9b(h).
22. See id. §§ 22-6A-7(h)(1)–(3), (i)(1)–(3).
23. Id. §§ 22-6A-7(h)(1), (i)(1); see also § 22C-9-2(a)(12) (defining “deep
wells” as those drilled to a depth below the top of the uppermost member of the
Onondaga Group, and including Utica wells).
24. W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-7(h)(1).
25. Id. § 22-6A-7(h)(2).
26. Id. § 22-6A-7(h)(3).
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To file an expedited permit modification application, the operator
must pay an additional fee of $5,000 for each horizontal well.27 Upon
receipt of the permit application, WVDEP must issue or deny an
expedited permit within twenty days unless WVDEP seeks additional
information or modification from the applicant, which tolls the
twenty-day period until WVDEP receives the requested information.28
For each day WVDEP exceeds the allotted time for approving or
denying the expedited permit application, the agency must refund
$500 per day.29
On March 23, 2020, Governor Justice signed HB 4090 into law,
which lowered the severance tax on certain marginally producing oil
and gas wells30 and created the Oil and Gas Abandoned Well Plugging
Fund.31 Specifically, HB 4090 lowered the severance tax rate on wells
(excluding wells utilizing horizontal drilling techniques targeting
shale formations) that produced an average between 5,000 and 60,000
cubic feet of natural gas per day during the calendar year immediately
preceding the beginning date of a given taxable year.32 On applicable
wells, HB 4090 lowered the severance tax from 5% to 2.5% of the
gross value of production as shown by the gross proceeds derived from
the sale.33 HB 4090 requires placement of the 2.5% severance tax into
the newly created Oil and Gas Abandoned Well Plugging Fund, which
is designed to fund WVDEP efforts to plug and reclaim abandoned oil
and gas wells without a responsible operator.34
On March 25, 2020, Governor Justice signed HB 4088 into law,
which allows certain unclaimed funds related to oil and gas interests
to be deposited into the newly-created Oil and Gas Reclamation
Fund.35 Under preexisting provisions codified in Chapter 55, Article
12A (“Lease and Conveyance of Mineral Interests Owned by Missing
or Unknown Owners or Abandoning Owners”), if an owner of a

27. Id. § 22-6A-7(i)(1).
28. Id. § 22-6A-7(i)(2).
29. Id. § 22-6A-7(i)(3).
30. Id. § 11-13A-3a.
31. Id. § 22-6-29a.
32. Id. § 11-13A-3a(b)(2). For oil wells, the severance decrease applies to wells
(excluding wells utilizing horizontal drilling techniques targeting shale formations)
that produced an average between one-half barrel per day and 10 barrels per day,
during the calendar year immediately preceding the beginning date of a given
taxable year.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 37-4-9.
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mineral interest leased through a special commissioner’s lease36
remains unknown or missing, or does not disavow abandonment, for
a period of seven years from the date of the special commissioner’s
lease, the party that received the unclaimed funds must report the
funds as unclaimed to the court.37 If the owners of the surface estate
present proof of ownership in fee of the surface estate, the court must
order the special commissioner to convey the mineral interest to the
surface owners.38 Until HB 4088, the court also awarded the
unclaimed funds attributable to the mineral interest to the surface
owners.39 However, HB 4088 now directs that these funds be paid to
the Oil and Gas Reclamation Fund, which is used to reclaim and plug
abandoned wells that have either been inadequately plugged or never
plugged at all.40
III. OIL AND GAS LITIGATION
In the past year, significant decisions concerning oil and gas title
and lease issues have been issued by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.
A. West Virginia Supreme Court Holds Joint Operating
Agreements May Create Partnerships
In Northeast Natural Energy LLC v. Pachira Energy LLC, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia determined that a joint
operating agreement (“JOA”) creating an area of mutual interest
(“AMI”) may result in a partnership under the Uniform Partnership
Act. By way of background, Northeast and Pachira created the
Blacksville AMI, which the two parties jointly owned 75%–25%
through a JOA and for which Northeast acted as the operator.41 The
Blacksville AMI included a water system used to transport water from
the Monongahela River to wells inside the AMI.42 Pachira learned that
Northeast intended to use the water system to transport water from the
Monongahela River to wells outside the AMI and to sell water to third
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
2020).
42.

See id. § 55-12A-7.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. § 22-6-29(b)(1).
Ne. Nat. Energy LLC v. Pachira Energy LLC, 844 S.E.2d 133, 136 (W. VA.
Id.
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parties outside the AMI.43 Pachira received a preliminary injunction
from the circuit court enjoining Northeast from using the AMI water
system to transport and sell water to third parties for use outside of the
AMI.44
In upholding the injunction, the Supreme Court of Appeals found
that Pachira made a substantial case before the circuit court indicating
that the parties formed a water system partnership and rejected
Northeast’s argument that the parties owned the water system as
tenants in common.45 Specifically, the Supreme Court of Appeals
relied on the broad definition of “partnership” found in the Partnership
Act: “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit . . . whether or not the persons intend to form a
partnership.”46 Further, the Court noted that property purchased with
partnership funds, such as the AMI water system, “is presumed to be
partnership property, notwithstanding the name in which title is
held.”47
The Court also rejected Northeast’s argument that Pachira did not
demonstrate irreparable harm because Pachira could be compensated
with money damages if Pachira succeeded on the merits of its claims.
The Court instead held that “the term irreparable does not always mean
what it seems to signify, that is, a physical impossibility of
reparation.”48 The Court held that an “irreparable injury is one that is
actual and imminent, and it is likely that the past offensive conduct
will recur.”49 Significantly, the Court also noted that the Partnership
Act “charges a partner with a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the
partnership and to other partners” and that breach of a partner’s
fiduciary duty of loyalty also supports injunctive relief.50
B. Supreme Court of Appeals Applies Equitable Defenses to Settle
Title Issues
In EQT Prod. Co. v. Taschler, the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld
a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a landowner
who sought to quiet title to certain mineral interests in Ritchie County.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 140.
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The facts of Taschler are somewhat unique: the tract at issue was
subject to a 1905 lease.51 In 1985, the landowner’s predecessor in
interest filed an action to challenge the validity of the 1905 lease and
received a default judgment.52 In 2015, the defendant executed a
“ratified lease agreement” (as lessee) with “an heir of the predecessor
in title of the original lessor” (as lessor) under the 1905 lease.53 The
landowner filed suit in 2016 to quiet title.54
The defendant argued that the 1985 default judgment “ha[d] no
legal force or effect and [was] not binding upon [the defendant]
because the mineral owner/lessor and lessee were not joined as parties
in that action.”55 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the grant of summary
judgment, among other reasons, because “given the passing of thirtysix years since entry of the default judgment, [the defendant] was
estopped, pursuant to the doctrine of laches, from asserting any
arguments regarding the impropriety of the default judgment awarded
. . . .”56
The Court also upheld the application of laches to a title dispute in
Van Camp v. McIntyre. In Van Camp, the will at issue, given effect in
1910, allowed a trustee to sell a specific tract provided that the trustee
retain the mineral rights and convey them to the beneficiary of the
residue clause.57 The trustee sold the tract in 1910 but failed to reserve
the mineral rights.58 The successors in interest to the beneficiary under
the residue clause brought suit in 2016, claiming (in part) that the
trustee violated the limitation in the will by not reserving the mineral
rights.59 The circuit court granted summary judgment against the
successors in interest on the basis of laches, and the Supreme Court of
Appeals upheld the grant of summary judgment, finding that “the
expiration of over 100 years from [the] conveyance mandated the
application of the doctrine of laches to preclude the claim by the
petitioners.”60

51. EQT Prod. Co. v. Taschler, No. 19-0370, 2020 WL 3407766, at *1 (W. Va.
June 18, 2020).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *2.
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Van Camp v. McIntyre, No. 18-0760, 2020 WL 877817, at *1–2 (Va. Feb.
24, 2020).
58. Id. at *2.
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id. at *4.
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In June 2020, the Court upheld the grant of a summary judgment in
U.S. Exploration, LLC v. Griffin Producing Co., among other reasons,
on the basis of unclean hands. In Griffin, the lessee (a family-owned
company named Magnum) was the subject of a hotly contested
divorce proceeding between the president and vice-president.61 The
Magnum vice-president purported to convey the 4,000 acre oil and gas
lease at issue to a company he solely owned (U.S. Exploration), but
the conveyance was not immediately recorded.62 Subsequently, the
Magnum president executed a partial release of the lease at issue, and
the partial release was recorded first-in-time.63
The Court expressed some concern regarding the “troubling
question” of whether the Magnum president and vice-president
executed conveyances in conflict with the equitable distribution order
in the divorce proceeding.64 The Court noted the general rule in West
Virginia:
When a party to a divorce case undertakes—before the
final order of equitable distribution in the case is
effective—to transfer real property to a third party
having actual knowledge of the divorce proceedings,
the transfer is effective only to the extent it does not
conflict with the equitable distribution order unless the
other party to the divorce joins in the transfer. To the
extent the attempted transfer conflicts with the order of
equitable distribution and there is evidence that the
transfer was made to avoid application of the equitable
distribution statutes or was otherwise a fraudulent
conveyance, it is void.65
Despite the general rule and the Court’s identification of the “troubling
question,” no facts in evidence demonstrated whether the partial
release violated an order in the divorce proceeding or even whether
the divorce proceeding was ongoing at the time of the partial release.66

61. U.S. Expl. v. Griffin, No. 18-0847, 2020 WL 3163644, at *1, *2 (W. Va.
2020).
62. Id. at *2–3.
63. Id. at *3.
64. Id. at *8.
65. Id. at *8 (quoting Syl. Pt. 7, Whiteside v. Whiteside, 663 S.E.2d 631 (W.Va.
2008)).
66. Id.
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Irrespective of whether an order in the divorce proceeding would
have prohibited the conveyance of marital or corporate assets
(including the partial release executed by the president), the Court
found that the vice president and U.S. Exploration violated the general
rule first “and cannot now complain that [the president] subsequently
violated it by executing” the partial release.67 Stated another way: “we
believe that the doctrine of unclean hands prohibits [the vicepresident], and by extension U.S. Exploration, a company he owns,
from raising this issue.”68 Therefore, the Court upheld the circuit
court’s ruling effectuating the partial release under the West Virginia
race-notice provisions.69
C. Supreme Court of Appeals Construes Royalty Reservation
In Haught Family Trust v. Williamson, the Supreme Court of
Appeals upheld a circuit court interpretation of a deed that reserved
“one half of the proceeds of all gas [that] may be produced from said
tract of land” as a reservation of a royalty interest and not as a
reservation of any oil and gas in place. In upholding the circuit court
interpretation, the Supreme Court of Appeals relied on the longstanding general rule in Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., which
provides that “the words ‘when produced’ [do not speak] in terms of
an interest in the oil and gas then in place, but rather of the royalty
interest which would follow production of oil or gas, or both.”70
D. Fourth Circuit Reverses Southern District on Lease
Interpretation
In Lucey v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded an order
granting a motion to dismiss issued by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia.
The facts and legal controversy in Lucey are not complex: the
primary term of the lease ended on August 21, 2011.71 The lessors
filed suit after the end of the primary term, alleging that the lease had

67. Id. at *9.
68. Id. at *8.
69. Id.
70. Haught Family Trust v. Williamson, No. 19-0368, 2020 WL 1911459 (W.
Va. Apr. 20, 2020); see also Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963).
71. Lucey v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 786 Fed. Appx. 394, 395 (4th Cir.
Oct. 1, 2019).
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terminated.72 The parties entered into a settlement agreement with an
effective date of October 29, 2012.73 As part of the settlement
agreement, the lessee received a new leasehold interest, and the lessee
agreed to pay the lessors “an additional $500.00/acre . . . if there [was]
not a commencement of two [] wells within one [] year of the effective
date of this agreement.”74 Prior to October 29, 2013, the lessee pooled
the leased acreage with four off-tract wells commenced prior to the
effective date of the settlement agreement.75
As discussed by the Fourth Circuit, “the only issue . . . is whether
the condition precedent for [the lessee] to avoid paying [a]dditional
[c]onsideration required that [the lessee] commence two wells at any
time before October 29, 2013, or whether it required that [the lessee]
commence two wells between October 29, 2012 (the effective date of
the [s]ettlement [a]greement) and October 29, 2013.”76
The district court determined that the settlement agreement only
required the commencement of two wells at any time before October
29, 2013.77 In reversing, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s
decision rendered the additional compensation provision superfluous:
The district court ruled that the former was the
unambiguous intent of the parties. We reject this
finding. Applying the district court’s reasoning, the
wells had already been commenced at the time the
Settlement Agreement was executed. Thus, the
condition precedent to Chesapeake owing no further
compensation had already been met. As such, there
were no circumstances under which Chesapeake would
ever owe Additional Consideration. Accordingly, the
district court’s interpretation of the agreement rendered
the one-year deadline and the negotiated amount of
additional compensation superfluous.78
The Fourth Circuit also found the use of the word “within” significant:

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 395–96.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
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The primary definition of the word ‘within’ is ‘inside,
enclosed by.’ The use of the word ‘within’ in the context
of time computation requires two boundary points,
together framing a time period ‘inside’ of which or
‘enclosed by’ which the relevant events must occur. Had
the parties intended that the wells could be commenced
at any time prior to October 29, 2013, the [s]ettlement
[a]greement likely would have said so.79
E. Northern District Construes Wellbore Conveyance
In Mountaineer Minerals, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp., the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held that a
conveyance of two specific wells, “and any and all leasehold rights
associated therewith,” conveyed “leasehold rights only insofar as
those rights pertained to those specific [a]ssigned [w]ells.” The parties
to the case disputed whether the conveyance of “any and all leasehold
rights associated” with the specifically enumerated shallow wells
included the leasehold rights associated with the Marcellus shale.80 In
holding that the conveyance was limited to those rights pertaining to
the specifically enumerated wells, the court noted that its reasoning
was bolstered by the assignment’s mention of specific obligations
related to the wells, including the obligation to pay royalty, and the
assignee’s right to produce and operate the assigned wells.81
F.

Northern District Emphasizes Pleading Requirements for
Breach of Lease Actions

In Langford v. Antero Resources Corp., Judge Keeley granted, in
part, a motion to dismiss where the lessor-plaintiffs failed “to
adequately plead the elements of [a] breach of contract claim” related
to a lease with Antero Resources. The plaintiffs alleged that Antero
failed to properly pay the royalty by deducting certain costs and
expenses from the royalty in contravention of the lease terms.82 After
noting that the plaintiffs failed to attach the leases at issue to the
complaint, Judge Keeley held:
79. Id. at 397–98.
80. Mountaineer Minerals, LLC v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:16CV28, 2019 WL
5727589, at *1, *5 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 5, 2019).
81. Id.
82. Langford v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:19CV178, 2020 WL 608285, at *1
(N.D. W.Va. Feb. 7, 2020).
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The [p]laintiffs’ [c]omplaint fails to adequately
identify their oil and gas interests in the subject
property. It does not identify or explain the parties’
obligations under the various contracts and
modifications at issue, and it fails to allege how Antero
even acquired its alleged interests, if any, in the subject
leases. In addition, the [c]omplaint fails to allege
whether the [p]laintiffs have performed their
obligations under the contracts, and fails to identify the
specific contract provisions Antero breached.83
Langford highlights the importance of pleading with specificity in
federal court.
G. Northern District Certifies Lessor Class Action Against Antero
In Romeo v. Antero Resources Corp., Judge Keely certified a class
of royalty owners who alleged that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs and failed to pay royalties on the basis of the price
received at the point of sale.84 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought
certification of a class that included those with leases that required
Antero to do the following:
(a) to pay monthly Lessors’ proportionate share of the
one-eighth [] of the value at the well of the gas from
each and every gas well drilled on said premises,
the product from which is marketed and used off
the premises . . . or
(b) to pay Lessor as royalty for the native gas from
each and every well drilled on said premise[s]
producing native gas, as amount equal to oneeighth [] of the gross proceeds received from the
sale of the same at the prevailing price for gas sold
at the well, for all native gas saved and marketed
from the said premises, payable quarterly.85
Without determining the merits of the claim, Judge Keeley determined
that the proposed class satisfied the four requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
83. Id. at *2–3.
84. Romeo v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:17CV88, 2020 WL 1430468, at *1 (N.D.
W.Va. Mar. 23, 2020).
85. Id. at *7.
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adequacy of representation) and the three requirements of Rule 23(b)
(predominance, superiority, and ascertainability).86
Judge Keeley “readily conclude[d]” that the numerosity
requirement was satisfied because counsel for the plaintiffs identified
over 700 individuals or entities with lease language identical to that of
the proposed class representatives.87 Judge Keeley also determined
that Antero did not significantly contest the adequacy of
representation and that the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) is
“subsumed under, or superseded by, the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3)
requirement that questions common to the class predominate over
other questions.”88 Judge Keeley also found that the proposed class
demonstrated typicality despite significant possible differences in
individual claims:
Although their claims may differ factually because gas
was extracted from different wells, gas was sold at
different points of sale, gas was transported to different
locations, gas was processed or unprocessed, or Antero
took different types of deductions for post-production
expenses, the representative Plaintiffs’ claims all arise
from the same practice or course of conduct and are
based on the same legal theory. Indeed, all of the
breach of contract claims are based on the theory that
Antero has been unlawfully deducting post-production
expenses from the Plaintiffs’ royalty payments. And
although the Plaintiffs’ damages may vary based on the
amount and frequency of Antero’s allegedly unlawful
deductions, the class representatives and class
members need not have suffered identical injuries or
damages.89
Judge Keeley also concluded that the proposed class satisfied the
predominance, superiority, and ascertainability requirements of Rule
23(b). As to predominance, Judge Keeley identified four common
questions of law and fact that “far outweigh the dissimilarities in
damages among class members that likely will require individualized
inquires.” The four common questions included:
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at *8–13.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9 (internal quotations omitted).
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(1) Do Wellman90 and Tawney91 apply to both market value and
proceeds leases?
(2) If so, do the leases at issue, as modified by any subsequent
modifications (if any), have the specific language required by
Wellman and Tawney that would allow Antero to deduct postproduction expenses from the Plaintiffs’ royalty payments?
(3) If not, did Antero unlawfully deduct post-production expenses
from the Plaintiffs’ royalty payments?
(4) If so, how did Antero calculate these deductions?92
Finally, and given the pervasiveness of common questions of law and
fact, Judge Keeley found that a class action was superior to individual
litigation and that the class was ascertainable through Antero’s
accounting system and summary royalty reports.93
IV. CONCLUSION
In the next year, the Northern District may opine on whether
Wellman and Tawney apply to both market value and proceeds lease—
an issue that will significantly affect both lessor and lessee interests in
West Virginia. Further, the Supreme Court of Appeals decision in
Pachira may spur similar litigation related to whether areas of mutual
interest create partnership assets—and also fiduciary duties—in other
jurisdictions. Finally, the legislature is expected to again be active with
respect to oil and gas issues in 2020. Bills that ultimately did not pass
in 2020, including those related to the tax treatment of natural
resources, partitions, and bonding, may be introduced and debated
again.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001).
Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
Romeo, 2020 WL 1430468, at *10.
Id. at *12–13.

